Developers building cryptography into security-sensitive applications face a daunting task. Not only must they understand the security guarantees delivered by the constructions they choose, they must also implement and combine them correctly and efficiently. Cryptographic compilers free developers from this task by turning high-level specifications of security goals into efficient implementations. Yet, trusting such tools is hard as they rely on complex mathematical machinery and claim security properties that are subtle and difficult to verify. In this paper we present ZKCrypt, an optimizing cryptographic compiler achieving an unprecedented level of assurance without sacrificing practicality for a comprehensive class of cryptographic protocols, known as Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge. The pipeline of ZKCrypt integrates purposebuilt verified compilers and verifying compilers producing formal proofs in the CertiCrypt framework. By combining the guarantees delivered by each stage, ZKCrypt provides assurance that the output implementation securely realizes the abstract proof goal given as input. We report on the main characteristics of ZKCrypt, highlight new definitions and concepts at its foundations, and illustrate its applicability through a representative example of an anonymous credential system.
INTRODUCTION
Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge (ZK-PoKs) [33, 34] are two-party protocols in which a prover convinces a verifier that it knows a secret piece of information satisfying some property without revealing anything except the correctness of this claim. ZKPoKs allow obtaining assurance on a prover's honest behavior without compromising privacy, and are used in a number of practical systems, including Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [15] , a privacy-enhancing mechanism for remote authentication of computing platforms, the identity mixer [17] , an anonymous credential system for user-centric identity management, Off-the-Record messaging [13, 31] , a protocol enabling deniability in instant messaging protocols, and privacy-friendly smart metering [47] , an emerging technology for smart meters. However, more than 25 years after their inception [32] , the potential of ZK-PoKs has not yet been fully realized, and many interesting applications of ZK-PoKs still only exist at the specification level. In our experience, one main hurdle towards a larger use of ZK-PoKs is the difficulty of designing and correctly implementing these protocols for custom proof goals.
Zero-knowledge compilers [6, 43] are domain-specific compilers that automatically generate ZK-PoKs for a large class of proof goals. They are a promising enabling technology for ZK-PoKs, because they allow developers to build cryptographic protocols that use them, without deep expertise in cryptography, and without the risk of introducing security flaws in their implementations. Zeroknowledge compilers embed a sophisticated mathematical machinery, and as a consequence implementing them correctly can be difficult-arguably more difficult than implementing optimizing compilers. Moreover, such compilers cannot be tested and debugged because their purported correctness properties are formulated in the style of provable security, and testing such properties is out of reach of current methods. This leaves practitioners with no other option than blindly trusting that the compiler is correct.
Contributions. We present ZKCrypt, a high-assurance zero-knowledge compiler that outputs formally verified and optimized implementations of ZK-PoKs for a comprehensive set of proof goals. We consider in particular Σ-protocols [24] for proving knowledge of pre-images under group homomorphisms, which underly essentially all practically relevant applications of ZK-PoKs, including those mentioned above and the identification schemes by Schnorr [49] and Guillou-Quisquater [36] .
ZKCrypt achieves an unprecedented level of confidence among cryptographic compilers by leveraging and transposing to the realm of cryptography two recent breakthroughs: verified compilation [39] , in which the correctness of a compiler is proved once and for all, and verifying compilation [45, 52] , in which the correctness of the output of a compiler is proved for each run. Specifically, ZKCrypt implements a verified compiler that generates a reference implementation, and a verifying compiler that outputs an optimized implementation provably equivalent to the reference implementation. Taken together, the proofs output by the compilers establish that the reference and optimized implementations satisfy the following properties 1 (see §3 for formal definitions):
• Completeness: an honest prover can always convince an honest verifier; • Proof of knowledge: a malicious prover not knowing the secret cannot convince the verifier, except with some small probability; • Zero-knowledge: a verifier following the protocol cannot learn additional information about the secret.
The architecture of the compiler is shown in Figure 1 . At the top level, ZKCrypt is composed of a chain of compilation components that generates C and Java implementations of ZK-PoKs; these implementations can be turned into executable binaries using generalpurpose compilers. These top-level components are an extension of the CACE compiler [2] with support for user-defined templates and high-level proof goals. At the bottom level, ZKCrypt generates formal proofs in the CertiCrypt framework [8] . The compilation component is independent of the verification component.
The main compilation phases in ZKCrypt are the following:
Resolution takes a user-friendly description of proof goal G and outputs an equivalent goal Gres, where high-level range restrictions are converted, using standard techniques, into proofs of knowledge of pre-images under homomorphisms; such pre-image proofs are atomic building blocks that correspond to well known concrete instances of ZK-PoK protocols, which can be handled by subsequent compilation phases. The correctness of resolution is captured by a transformation that provably converts ZK-PoK protocols for Gres into ZK-PoK protocols for G. The compiler implements both the decomposition and the transformation, and we prove a set of sufficient conditions for correctness and security; Verified compilation takes a resolved goal Gres and outputs a ref-
erence implementation I ref in the embedded language of CertiCrypt. A once-and-for-all proof of correctness guarantees that this component only produces reference implementations that satisfy the relevant security properties, for all supported input goals. This result hinges on two contributions of independent interest: a unified treatment of the proof of knowledge property, and a formalization of statistical zeroknowledge; Implementation takes a resolved goal Gres and outputs an optimized implementation Iopt. The correctness of this step is established, in the style of verifying compilation, using an equivalence checker proving semantic equivalence between the reference and optimized implementations I ref and Iopt. Generation takes the optimized implementation Iopt and produces implementations of the protocol in general-purpose languages. This component in the compiler is the same as that presented in [2] , and is not verified.
Combining the correctness results for each phase yields a proof that the optimized implementation Iopt satisfies the security properties of the original high-level goal G. This approach is the same as verified compilers such as CompCert [39] . As in CompCert, it is convenient to combine certified and certifying compilation, instead of certifying the whole compiler chain. Our results show that these techniques are also beneficial for cryptographic compilers.
New additions to the compiler. There are main two aspects in which this work extends the CACE compiler [2] . Firstly, the verification back-end of ZKCrypt supports more proof goals: by addressing Σ GSP -protocols and high-level goal resolution, we can verify implementations satisfying the needs of many practical applications. Secondly, in addition to soundness, ZKCrypt also formally verifies the completeness and HVZK properties, covering all properties relevant to practical applications. Achieving these extensions posed significant challenges. The theoretical aspects surrounding Σ GSP -protocols are knottier compared to Σ φ -protocols addressed in [2, 11] . For example, reasoning about statistical distance and dealing with computational assumptions required to develop a backend from scratch based on cryptography-specific verification tools. Indeed, using formal tools such as CertiCrypt as backends for verifying the compilation of cryptographic protocols is unprecedented.
Limitations. Although the verification component of our compiler is comprehensive, it currently has two limitations. First, ZKCrypt delivers formal guarantees about the correctness of the optimized implementation Iopt, but not for the last step in the compilation chain, namely the generation of Java or C code. Although we consider the verification of this last compilation step as an important direction for future development, we see this as an independent line of work because the verification goals involved at this level are of a different nature to those presented in this paper. Specifically, the natural path to achieve correctness guarantees about binaries is to extend ZKCrypt with formal verification at the code generation level, and then to use a high-assurance compiler from C or Java to binaries. Given the characteristics of the programming language used for the optimized implementations Iopt, the key step to adding a formal verification back-end for code generation is to build a certified number theory library that matches the one provided with the CACE compiler. Compilation from C to binaries can then be certified directly using state-of-the-art verified compilers, such as CompCert [39] . Second, we do not prove completeness of verification, i.e., that all CACE compiler programs can be verified by our component. A reason for this is that there are some known sources of incompleteness, as some of the proof goals that can be handled by the CACE compiler are not yet supported. A more fundamental reason is that certifying compilation techniques, as used by part of the formal verification back-end, are seldom proved complete; instead, one validates the effectiveness of a technique by its ability to cover a wide range of examples. As we will show, ZKCrypt satisfactorily complies with this more practical view, as the class of goals for which verification is available is already broad enough to cover most practical applications.
Paper organization. The applicability of ZKCrypt is illustrated in §2 through a use case from the identity mixer anonymous credential system [17] ; §3 provides some necessary background material; §4- §6 explain the resolution, verified compilation and implementation phases, respectively; §7 briefly reports on further experimental results. We conclude with a discussion of related work in §8 and future research directions in §9.
USE CASE
Anonymous credential systems [22, 23] are among the most practically relevant applications of ZK-PoKs; examples of prominent realizations include the IBM identity mixer library (Idemix) [21] , the Microsoft U-Prove toolkit [44] , as well as Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs), which implement the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol [15] , and are widely built into consumer laptops and PCs. In a further and coordinated effort to bring anonymous credential systems to practice, the ABC4Trust project [1] is working to deliver open reference implementations of attributebased credential systems, and to integrate them into real-world identity-management systems.
An anonymous credential system consists of a collection of protocols to issue, revoke, prove possession of credentials, etc. One key feature for ensuring anonymity is that users can selectively reveal certain identity attributes without disclosing anything else. In the Idemix system [21] this goal is realized using CamenischLysyanskana (CL) signatures [18] . Informally, such a signature on two messages m1, m2 consists of integers e, v and A ∈ Z * n satisfy-
v A e , where R1, R2, S, Z are public quadratic residues modulo n, and n is a strong RSA modulus (i.e., n = pq where p, q, (p − 1)/2 and (q − 1)/2 are all prime).
Assume now that a user holds a signature on his name m1 and his birthdate m2. Now, when authenticating to a server, the user may be willing to reveal his name but not his birthdate. On the other hand, he is required to show that he was born after some date b to get student discount. To achieve authentication agreeably to both parties, the user will reveal m1 and A, and then give a ZK-PoK that he knows m2, e, v such that (e, v, A) is a valid CL-signature on (m1, m2). Using the standard notation for ZK-PoK [20] , this goal G is formally stated as:
The convention in the formulation above is that knowledge of all values before the colon has to be proved, while all other values are assumed to be publicly known. Note that the first conjunct shows possession of a valid CL-signature on m1, m2, and the second conjunct shows that m2 ≥ b, as required by the server policy.
ZKCrypt generates an optimized implementation of a ZK-PoK and machine-checkable proofs that it satisfies the relevant security properties. We give below an overview of the compilation process.
Resolution. ZKCrypt resolves the above proof goal G to the following goal Gres:
ZPK (e, m2, v, r∆, u1, u2, u3, u4, r1, r2, r3, r4, α) :
The first conjunct is obtained by unfolding the definition of the CL predicate, making explicit the groups elements Z and S used in the signature. The remaining conjuncts are obtained by applying Lipmaa's technique [40] to resolve the goal m2 ≥ b into equalities between exponentiations of Z and S. This compilation step and the formal verification of its correctness are described in detail in §4. In short, we formalize the sufficient conditions for correctness based on a procedure Translate for turning a witness for G into a witness for Gres and a procedure Recover for computing a witness for Gres from a witness for G.
Verified compilation This phase outputs a reference implementation I ref in the embedded language of CertiCrypt. This is done in two steps: first, ZKCrypt extends the base language of CertiCrypt by specifying and defining the necessary algebraic constructions, e.g., the underlying group with its operations and generators. Second, the compiler instantiates a CertiCrypt module for Σ-protocols with the resolved goal Gres expressed using a single homomorphism Φ. In the use case we present, Φ is defined as:
Φ (e, m2, v, r∆, u1, u2, u3, u4, r1, r2, r3, r4, α) .
This instantiation yields a reference implementation 
ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOFS
In the remainder, we denote deterministic assignments by y ← f (x), and uniformly random assignments by x $ ← A, where A may be a set or a randomized algorithm.
All ZK proofs generated by ZKCrypt are Σ-protocols:
. Let R denote a binary relation, (x, w) ∈ R, and let P1, P2, and V denote arbitrary algorithms. A protocol between a prover P . = P(x, w) and a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) verifier V . = V(x) is called a Σ-protocol with challenge set C = {0, . . . , c + -1}, if it satisfies the following conditions.
3-move form. The protocol is of the following form:
• P sets (r, st) $ ← P1(x, w) and sends r to V; • V sends a random challenge c $ ← C to P. We refer to the algorithm that samples the challenge as Vc;
Completeness. For an honest prover P, the verifier V accepts on common input x, whenever (x, w) ∈ R.
Every triple (r, c, s) for which V(x, r, c, s) = true is called an accepting conversation.
Informally, a two-party protocol is a proof of knowledge if from every successful (potentially malicious) prover P * , a witness can be extracted within a certain time bound by a knowledge extractor algorithm. For all practically relevant Σ-protocols, the knowledge extractor works in two phases. First, using rewinding black-box access to P * , two accepting conversations (r, c, s) and (r, c ′ , s ′ ) are extracted. Then, in a second step, a witness is computed from these conversations. The first part of the knowledge extractor is well-known to work for arbitrary Σ-protocols [26] . ZKCrypt does not include a formalization of the proof of this part of the knowledge extractor, as this would imply formalizing rewinding arguments and reasoning about expected polynomial time executions, which are currently out of reach of formal verification tools such as CertiCrypt. The second phase of extraction only works only under certain conditions, which are formalized next:
DEFINITION 2 (GENERALIZED SPECIAL SOUNDNESS).
A Σ-protocol satisfies generalized special soundness for a relation R ′ , if there is a PPT extractor that, on input a relation R $ ← R(1 λ ), a value x in the language defined by R, and any two accepting conversations, (r, c, s) and (r, c ′ , s ′ ) satisfying R ′ , computes a witness w satisfying R(x, w) with overwhelming probability.
Observe that a Σ-protocol satisfying this definition is a proof of knowledge for R if the conversations extracted by the first phase of the knowledge extractor satisfy R ′ . Definition 2 is a generalization of the classical notion of special soundness found in the literature, e.g., Cramer [24] , and enables a uniform formalization of the proof of knowledge property for all Σ-protocols supported by ZKCrypt. Following this approach we extend the modularization of the proof of knowledge property that is well-known for other Σ-protocols, so that we can treat Σ GSPprotocols in a similar way.
Roughly, the special extractor algorithm can only recover a valid witness if the accepting conversations display specific properties captured by relation R ′ . Furthermore, in some cases, the existence of an algorithm that is able to extract these conversations relies on a computational assumption. To account for this, following Damgård and Fujisaki [27] , we allow relation R to be sampled using an efficient algorithm R. We will detail R and R ′ for each concrete instance of a Σ-protocol later 2 . The implication for our formalization approach is that the soundness of the protocols verified by ZKCrypt is guaranteed, provided that the relations are sampled from the distribution generated by the prescribed algorithm R.
The proof of knowledge property ensures a verifier that a convincing prover indeed knows the secret. On the other hand, the verifier should not be able to deduce any information about this witness. This is captured by the zero-knowledge property. In the following, we denote by view P V (x) the random variable describing the content of the random tape of V and the messages V receives from P during a successful protocol run on common input x.
DEFINITION 3 (HONEST VERIFIER ZERO KNOWLEDGE).
A protocol (P, V) is perfectly (resp. statistically) honest-verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK), if there exists a PPT simulator S such that the distribution ensembles {S(x)}x and {view P V (x)}x are perfectly (resp. statistically) indistinguishable, for all inputs x in the language of R.
Note that this definition only gives guarantees against verifiers that do not deviate from the protocol specification. Security against arbitrarily behaving verifiers can be realized using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [29] to make the protocol non-interactive, which is also supported by our compiler (although, as we will explain later, this is currently outside of the scope of the verification back-end).
The Σ GSP -protocol. Most practical applications of ZK-PoKs are proofs for pre-images under a group homomorphism φ : G → H. Depending on whether G is finite or G ≃ Z, (typically) either the Σ φ -, the Σ exp -, or the Σ GSP -protocol is used [2] . In the following we recapitulate the Σ GSP -protocol, which is central for understanding the remainder, as it is used for the running example. All the mentioned techniques are also incorporated in ZKCrypt.
The so called Generalized Schnorr Protocol (Σ GSP -protocol) can be used to prove knowledge of pre-images under arbitrary exponentiation homomorphisms, in particular including such with a hiddenorder co-domain. That is, it can be used for mappings of the form:
In the protocol, an upper bound Ti on the absolute value of each wi needs to be known. These values can be chosen arbitrarily large, and required to assert that the protocol is (statistically) zeroknowledge for wi ∈ [−Ti, Ti]. The protocol flow and the parties' algorithms are given in Figure 2 , where ℓ is a security parameter. The Σ GSP -protocol is statistically HVZK for arbitrary values of c + (the simulation error is upper-bounded by m/2 ℓ ). Concerning generalized special soundness, the relation generator R picks a group H in which the generalized strong RSA assumption [30] holds (i.e., given x $ ← H, it is hard to find (w, e) ∈ H × Z \ {−1, 0, 1} such that x = w e ), and defines:
Here, φ is as before, the gij are generators of a large subgroup of H with hidden order such that all relative discrete logarithms (i.e., all log g ij guv) are unknown to P, and d is the product of all primes smaller than c + dividing ord H. The relation R ′ is defined as follows:
It can be shown [27] that the conversations extracted in the first step of the knowledge extractor satisfy R ′ with overwhelming probability, given that H satisfies the generalized RSA assumption and φ is defined as above. Thus, the Σ GSP -protocol satisfies Definition 2 and is a ZK-PoK for R ′ . For instance, if n = pq is sampled as a strong RSA modulus, H = Z * n and the gij all generate the quadratic residues modulo n, we get d = 4 and knowledge of a pre-image is proved up to a fourth root of unity.
Combination of proof goals. In practice one often has to prove knowledge of multiple, or one out of a set of secret values in one step. This can be achieved by so-called And-and Or-compositions [25] . To support our description of the Idemix example in the rest of the paper we only require And-compositions of Σ GSP -protocols for homomorphisms φ1, . . . , φn. This can be realized by running a single Σ GSP -protocol for the homomorphism φ = φ1 × · · · × φn.
GOAL RESOLUTION
ZKCrypt generates implementations for arbitrary Boolean Andand Or-compositions of pre-image proofs under homomorphisms and claims on the size of secrets. That is, besides claims on the knowledge of pre-images also terms of the form w ∈ [L, R] for secret w and public L, R ∈ Z are supported natively.
The first compilation step consists of rewriting all semantic expressions to pre-image proofs, i.e., every term w ∈ [L, R] is rewritten to a proof specification of the following form [38, 40] :
ZPK (w, r, w1, . . . , w8, r1, . . . , r8, rw, rL, rR) :
Here, g and h are both random generators of a group of hidden order (e.g., the quadratic residues modulo a strong RSA modulus n). Further, log g h and log h g must be hard to compute. If such a group is already used in the original proof goal, it may be reused.
A Cryptographic Perspective
We next describe how ZKCrypt deals with the formal verification of the goal translation stage.
The starting point in the goal resolution procedure is a (highlevel) goal G associated to a relation generation algorithm R, i.e., we aim to construct a Σ-protocol for proving (in zero-knowledge) knowledge of a witness w for a public input x such that R(x, w) holds, for R sampled from R. The resolution procedure first defines a generator for a (lower-level) family of relations Rres associated with a resolved goal Gres and then defines a translation algorithm Translate(R, x, w) which, on input a relation R and a pair (x, w), produces the description of a relation Rres and a pair (x ′ , w ′ ). The following properties must be satisfied by the Translate algorithm:
1. Completeness. On a valid input (R, x, w), i.e., where R is in the range of R and R(x, w) holds, Translate outputs triples (Rres, x ′ , w ′ ) such that Rres is in the range of Rres, and Rres(x ′ , w ′ ) holds. 2. Soundness. There is an efficient algorithm Recover such that for all PPT adversaries A the following holds for
are in the range of Translate(R, x, w) and Rres(x ′ , w ′ ) holds, Recover(Rres, x ′ , w ′ ) outputsw such that R(x,w) holds with overwhelming probability. 3. Public verifiability. The public outputs of Translate, i.e.,
Rres and x ′ , can efficiently be checked to be in the correct range for all valid public inputs (R, x). 4. Simulatability. There exists an efficient simulator S which, on input R sampled from R and x in the language that it defines, outputs (Rres, x ′ ) with a distribution identical (or statistically close) to that produced by Translate(R, x, w) for a valid witness w.
Intuitively, public verifiability allows the verifier to check that the prover provides a valid output of Translate, and hence rely on the soundness of this algorithm. Simulatability is necessary for the HVZK property, as simulating traces for the complete protocol implies simulating the public outputs of Translate. Now, to construct a protocol for goal G, one first generates descriptions of algorithms P ′ 1 , P ′ 2 and V ′ of a Σ-protocol for Gres, and then defines the procedures for the high-level protocol as follows:
, and returns
• P2(x, w, c, st) recovers (Rres,
• V(x, r, c, s) recovers (Rres, x ′ , r ′ ) from r and checks that Rres and x are in the correct range w.r.t. R and x. Then it runs V ′ (x ′ , r ′ , c, s) and returns the result.
The correctness and security of the resulting protocol is established in the following theorem. 
This result permits identifying the proof obligations that suffice to formally verify that the resulting protocol is correct and secure. First of all, one needs to show that the low-level protocol is itself correct and secure for the relation generator Rres (in ZKCrypt this maps to the formal verification of subsequent compilation steps, which we discuss later). Secondly, one needs to show that the Translate procedure has all properties described in the theorem.
Idemix goal resolution. To make things more concrete, let us go back to the goal resolution performed by ZKCrypt and recast the rewriting performed for a term of the form w ≥ b in the theoretical framework above (an upper bound on w can be treated analogously). This matches the resolution of the proof goal in our Idemix running example. From §2, and using x = Z/R m 1 1 , we can rewrite the relation corresponding to goal G as
Here, we have w = (e, m2, v). Similarly, using Y1 = T∆Z b , the relation associated with resolved goal Gres is:
Here w ′ = (e, m2, v, r∆, u1, u2, u3, u4, r1, r2, r3, r4, α) and x ′ = (x, Y1, T1, T2, T3, T4, T∆). We observe that implicit in the definition of these goals are the relation generators R and Rres that produce descriptions of the (hidden order) groups and generators that are used in the protocol. Furthermore, note that the resolved goal Gres can be handled by the Σ GSP protocol, for which ZKCrypt can generate an implementation of a ZK-PoK protocol which is proven to display the relevant security properties. Figures 3 and 4 provide the pseudo-code of the Translate and Recover algorithms for the Idemix example. Observe the dual role of the Ti values in Gres: these values appear both as generators in Rres, and as images in x ′ . As we will see, this is essential to guarantee that witnesses for the original goal G can be recovered. We will now discuss how we prove that these algorithms satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 1, from which we can conclude that resolution is correct.
Translate(R, x, w): 
A Formal Verification Perspective
We will continue to rely on the Idemix example to illustrate our approach to verifying the goal translation step. We first show how we use EasyCrypt [10] to prove that the Translate algorithm from Figure 3 satisfies the completeness and soundness properties. We then discuss how the simulatability and public verifiability properties are handled with a once-and-for-all proof for supported goals.
Completeness of Translate. The idea underlying the completeness property is the following. Assume a prover knows w ≥ b. Then, by Lagrange's Four Square Theorem [38] , she can find integers u1, . . . , u4 such that
. By choosing r∆, r1, . . . , r4 at random, and defining α = r∆ − 4 i=1 uiri she can now clearly perform the above proof. Formally verifying this property using EasyCrypt is achieved by proving that the following experiment always returns true for all R in the range of R and all pairs (x, w) such that R(x, w) holds:
The Translate algorithm is represented in EasyCrypt in a form very close to its description in Figure 3 , with the sole difference that the decomposition of m2 − b as a sum of four squares is computed by applying a function assumed to correctly implement Lagrange's decomposition. The proof itself is written as a series of game transitions, where the initial experiment is gradually transformed until it is reduced to the trivial program that simply returns true. All transitions are proved automatically by the tool.
Soundness of Translate.
A detailed specification of the Recover algorithm for the Idemix example is given in Figure 4 . Let m 
then, with overwhelming probability, we have that a = a
Any witness w ′ given to Recover, satisfying Rres(x ′ , w ′ ), for publicly validated Rres and x ′ , can be expressed in the following form:
, the input witness would provide two alternative representations for the same value under generators Z and S, contradicting the unique representation assumption. Thus, necessarily with overwhelming probability m2 = m ′ 2 . Formally, if the group parameters are generated in a particular way, the unique representation assumption can be shown to hold in H = Z * n , down to the hardness of factoring the modulus n [19] , e.g. when n is sampled as a strong RSA modulus. The Idemix specification incorporates this method into its parameter generation procedure. We note that this computational assumption is used implicitly throughout relevant literature when dealing with such transformations. We believe that forcing such assumptions to be stated explicitly is one of the advantages of using mechanized support to validate security proofs for cryptographic protocols.
The correctness of this algorithm is again formally verified in EasyCrypt. The proof is more intricate than in the case of Translate, since we now must take into account the unique representation assumption. The proof is quantified for all relations R in the range of R, and all x and w such that R(x, w) holds. Consistently with the definition of the soundness property, we begin by defining the following experiment in EasyCrypt:
Here, an adversary (i.e., a malicious prover) A is given such an input (R, x, w), and outputs a tuple (Rres, x ′ , w ′ ). The Recover algorithm is then called to produce a high-level witness. The experiment output expresses that the event in which the adversary produces a valid tuple (Rres, x ′ , w ′ ) must imply that Recover succeeds in obtaining a valid high-level witness w * . This is expressed as a disjunction where either the adversary fails to produce publicly verifiable Rres, x ′ and a witness w ′ such that Rres(x ′ , w ′ ) holds, or Recover must succeed. Public verifiability is captured by a predicate pubVerify imposing that Y1 = T∆Z b , and gi = Ti for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
The proof establishes that this experiment is identical to the trivial program that always returns true, conditioning on a failure event that occurs when both Rres(x ′ , w ′ ) and pubVerif(Rres, x ′ ) hold, but the witness w ′ satisfies the following Boolean test:
riui + α Intuitively, this failure condition can be triggered only if the adversary was able to recover a low level witness which contradicts the unique representation assumption: in the proof we show that the probability of failure is bounded by the probability that an adversary B finds two different representations for the same group element under generators Z and S. On the other hand, conditioning on the event that failure does not occur, and through a series of transformations involving algebraic manipulations, we show that Recover always succeeds. Again, the validity of all transformations is handled automatically by EasyCrypt.
Integration and automation
The above approach to formally verifying the goal resolution procedure was not integrated in earlier versions of ZKCrypt. This meant that user intervention was required to deal with this compilation step, and hence the natural back-end to use was EasyCrypt. This was not a major limitation because in many practical scenarios, including Idemix, the output of goal resolution is the specification of the proof goal. Nevertheless, the latest release of ZKCrypt has been extended with an extra component that deals with this compilation step without user intervention. Formal verification of this phase is handled in two steps:
1. Given a high-level goal G, a certified goal resolution module implemented in Coq generates a description of a reference low-level goal G ref res and a description of the translation and recovery procedures. A once-and-for-all proof in Coq guarantees that translation is complete and sound for the reference low-level goal. This is done using essentially the same formalization approach as described above, extended to handle the general case of Σ GSP -type goals where each pre-image can be bounded with an arbitrary interval.
2. The resolved goal produced by the CACE compiler Gres is then proven to be equivalent to G ref res . This establishes that the goal resolution step carried out by the CACE compiler is indeed correct. The optimized implementation produced by the CACE compiler is generated from Gres, as described in the following Sections. This equivalence therefore provides guarantees of correctness and security of the generated optimized protocol with respect to the original high-level goal.
Public verifiability and simulatability. We now briefly discuss why the resolution procedure used in Idemix can be easily shown to satisfy public verifiability and simulatability. This argument extends to all instances of the resolution step implemented in ZKCrypt.
Looking at (4), one can immediately see that the public outputs of Translate can be validated to be in the correct range assuming that group membership can be efficiently checked, and given the fixed structure of the low-level relation. For simulatability we see that the description (Rres, x ′ ) output by Translate comprises the values of the images x ′ = (x, Y1, T1, T2, T3, T4, T∆) and generators (g1, g2, g3, g4) = (T1, T2, T3, T4). Since x and Y1 are fully determined by public inputs and (T1, T2, T3, T4, T∆), all that remains to show is that the latter values can be efficiently simulated. Observing that the domain of ri is sufficiently large for the distribution of S r i (i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, ∆}) to be statistically close to uniform in S , we conclude that the variables Ti are also statistically close to uniform (note that Z and S are both generators of the same group of hidden order). It follows that these values can be trivially simulated by sampling uniformly random elements in the target group.
VERIFIED COMPILATION
At the core of the formal verification tool of ZKCrypt sits a verified compiler that generates correct and secure reference implementations of ZK-PoK for the following class of resolved proof goals produced by the front end of the compiler: (i) Atomic goals consisting of pre-image proofs under a homomorphism with a finite domain using the Σ φ -protocol, including product homomorphisms where the co-domain is a tuple of images in the range of the group operation.
(ii) Atomic goals consisting of pre-image proofs under an exponentiation homomorphism in a hidden-order group using the Σ GSP -protocol, including product homomorphisms where the co-domain is a tuple of images in the range of the group operation. In particular, these include goals resulting from the resolution of interval proofs as described in §4. (iii) Arbitrary, possibly nested, AND-and OR-compositions of proof goals as in point (i).
We stress that, although the code generation component of ZKCrypt addresses an even broader set of proof goals, this class was selected to cover essentially all practical applications. Indeed, although we do not support compositions of Σ GSP -protocol, this is only a restriction for OR-compositions, which are rarely used in practice. Flat AND-compositions can be achieved with product homomorphisms. Given a resolved proof goal Gres, the verified compiler is able to generate a description of a reference implementation for a suitable Σ-protocol, consisting of CertiCrypt programs corresponding to algorithms P1, P2, V and Vc. The generated descriptions of these algorithms follow a carefully designed structure, tailored to facilitate the formal proof that, for any goal, the (therefore) verified compiler produces correct and secure reference implementations.
The challenge here was to find the best balance between the level of abstraction at which the formalization is performed in CertiCrypt, and our goal to give formal verification guarantees over the optimized implementations generated by ZKCrypt. On the one hand, proving that the reference implementations meet the prescribed correctness and security requirements is much easier if one can reason abstractly about homomorphisms, group operations, etc. On the other hand, we wish to prove observational equivalence to programs produced by ZKCrypt in what is essentially pseudo-code of an imperative language very close to common programming languages. We achieve a compromise between these two aspects, which enables us to reach both objectives simultaneously.
Concretely, we construct each algorithm as shown in Figure 5 , where we introduce annotations between angle brackets as in X Gres to make explicit the goal G an object X corresponds to.
Note that all algorithms have at most two statements: a random assignment that samples all necessary random values up-front, and a deterministic assignment that computes the output in terms of the input of the algorithm and the sampled random values. For example, in algorithm P1 Gres , the first operation corresponds to sampling a tuple uniformly at random from the set stType Gres , which corresponds to a Cartesian product of sets derived from the proof goal Gres. The second statement consists of a single assignment that evaluates a function of the inputs of the algorithm and the randomly sampled tuple; this is typically a huge expression performing all the necessary parsing and algebraic computations. More precisely, functions Prover1 Gres , Prover2 Gres and Verifier Gres may map to arbitrarily complex CertiCrypt expressions.
We observe that by restricting the reference implementation of protocols to the form shown in Figure 5 we do not lose generality. Indeed, this form is achievable for all goals, including those comprising arbitrary (possibly nested) Boolean compositions of atomic goals, which is a non-trivial aspect of the formalization approach adopted in ZKCrypt. Intuitively, for atomic goals, the computations performed by the reference implementation correspond to those described in §3 for the Σ φ -and Σ GSP -protocols. For Boolean combinations of Σ φ -protocols, the reference implementation is generated recursively by unfolding the inductively defined proof goal according to the standard procedures for Boolean composition described in §3. This is made possible by our approach to isolating random sampling operations from other computations. For illustrative purposes we present a short excerpt of the definition of the prover function Prover1 in Listing 1. The excerpt corresponds to the case of Boolean compositions of proof goals that can be handled using the Σ φ -protocol, and takes as input a pair (x, w) and the value stP comprising all values randomly sampled by the P1 Gres algorithm. The base case maps to a concrete homomorphism, whereas recursive calls construct homomorphisms for And and Or combinations.
Listing 1: Definition of algorithm Prover1 in Coq. In addition to the descriptions of reference implementations for the algorithms of Σ-protocols, the compiler also generates the auxiliary algorithms that are required to establish security. In particular, for each goal, the compiler generates definitions of a suitable simulator and special extractor that can be used in the theorem statements that capture the zero-knowledge and proof of knowledge properties. The ability to generate suitable simulators is also an essential part of generating ZK-PoK protocols for Or compositions of Σ φ -protocols. Indeed, the definitions of algorithms P1 and P2 explicitly rely on the simulator descriptions as part of their code, as can be seen in the snippet in Listing 1: in Or-compositions, the prover uses as a sub-procedure the simulator of the protocol for which it does not know a witness.
We discuss next how we prove the correctness and security properties of reference implementations for all supported proof goals.
Completeness. Completeness of reference implementations is
given by the CertiCrypt theorem below.
THEOREM 2 (COMPLETENESS). For all supported goals
Gres, and all pairs (x, w) satisfying the associated relation, we prove
Intuitively, this formalization states that in an honest execution, the verifier always will accept. Observe that, also in the protocol definition, the challenge generation is hoisted to the beginning of the protocol, as this facilitates proving equivalence claims. This is a valid transformation because we only have to prove that properties hold for an honest verifier that does not deviate from the protocol.
The proof of this theorem requires combined reasoning about the algebraic manipulations performed by the protocol parties. This is particularly challenging in the case of goals based on Σ φ , for which the proof is by induction on the structure of the goal, dealing with the recursive definitions of the algorithms themselves. For example, in Or-compositions one needs to deal with the rearrangement of recursive calls, by establishing intermediate results of the form:
This result states that the behavior of the protocol, when run on the prover side with the witnesses corresponding to goal G1 is identical to that of another procedure which explicitly relies on a protocol for goal G1 and a simulator for goal G2. The proof of this equivalence must then make use of the recursive definition of the protocol (itself based on the prover and verifier algorithms presented in Figure 5 ) and of the simulator, and requires proving that the needed code rearrangements do not modify the semantics of the experiments.
HVZK. Honest verifier ZK of reference implementations is given by the CertiCrypt theorem below.
THEOREM 3 (HVZK).
For all supported goals Gres, and for all pairs (x, w) satisfying the relation associated with Gres, we prove the following statistical equivalence:
Here, S Gres is the simulator algorithm generated by ZKCrypt for goal Gres. The concrete value of the statistical distance between the distributions depends on the goal. For the particular case of Σ φ -protocols and Boolean combinations thereof, this is actually 0, and so proving this property corresponds to showing that the distributions are identical, implying perfect HVZK. In this case, the type of reasoning required to construct the proof is very similar to that described for completeness.
On the contrary, proving the zero knowledge property of Σ GSPprotocols constitutes a significant challenge because it requires reasoning about statistical distance. Given any Σ GSP goal Gres defined over a homomorphism where the co-domain is a tuple of arbitrary size m, we bound the statistical distance in the statement above by ǫ Gres = m/2 ℓ , where ℓ is a concrete security parameter given as input to the compiler along with the goal specification (see §3). Establishing this result for arbitrary homomorphisms required reasoning about the number of points contained in hypercubes in Z m , and proving the upper bound using Bernoulli's inequality.
Proof of Knowledge.
The following CertiCrypt theorem ensures that all generated reference implementations satisfy the Generalized Special Soundness introduced in §3.
THEOREM 4 (PROOF OF KNOWLEDGE).
For every supported valid goals Gres, for all (x, w) satisfying the relation associated with Gres, and for any two accepting conversations (r, c, s) and (r, c
The theorem statement nicely matches Definition 2, where relation R ′ Gres expresses the restriction on traces described in §3 for either Σ φ -or Σ GSP -protocols, and E Gres denotes the knowledge extractor generated by the compiler. However, the theorem includes an additional validity restriction on proof goals that we now explain. Referring to §3, recall that for c + > 2 both the Σ φ -protocol and the Σ GSP -protocol can only be proven to satisfy Definition 2 if the underlying homomorphisms satisfy an additional property. Our notion of proof goal validity captures these extra restrictions. Concretely, the validity requirement for Σ φ goals implies that all prime factors of special exponents for homomorphisms are greater than c + . For the Σ GSP -protocol, the validity requirement is as follows. Recall, from §3 that R typically samples an RSA modulus n and defines a relation R as
Here, d is the product of the primes dividing the order of the multiplicative group modulo n, which are less than or equal to c + . We require for validity that d satisfies this property.
Proving this theorem in CertiCrypt posed a different sort of challenge when compared to the previous ones, as it is not formulated in the form of a program equivalence statement. Essentially, it translates into a proof goal formulated over the semantics of the underlying algebraic constructions. Here we make critical use of the extensive Coq library that is included in ZKCrypt and that was developed to support the semantics of the data types included in the necessary CertiCrypt extensions. In turn, this library makes intensive use of SSReflect [35] and its comprehensive Coq library on algebraic and number theoretic results.
IMPLEMENTATION
To establish our ultimate verification goal, we translate the optimized implementations of protocols generated by ZKCrypt to the language of CertiCrypt. By taking advantage of the convenient notation that ZKCrypt automatically sets up in CertiCrypt, this translation step is straightforward and essentially corresponds to pretty-printing the output implementation files. Our strategy to formally verify these optimized implementations is to first establish an intermediate result stating that these are correct with respect to a reference implementation. More precisely, we establish that each of the algorithms in the implementation file, namely P1, P2, V, and Vc, are observationally equivalent to the corresponding algorithms in the reference implementation. These results are formalized in CertiCrypt by lemmas that typically look as the one below.
LEMMA 1 (CORRECTNESS OF P1).
For all (x, w) in the domain of relation R, associated with resolved goal Gres, the following equivalence holds:
Here P ref 1 refers to the reference implementation for algorithm P1. Equivalence is formalized by imposing that, for any possible fixed input, the outputs of both algorithms are identically distributed. Several differences between the reference and optimized implementations make proving these lemmas non trivial:
1. The reference implementation is expressed at a slightly higher level of abstraction than the optimized implementation. In particular, the reference implementation expresses homomorphism computations as native operations in the CertiCrypt language, whereas these are expanded as lowerlevel operations over the underlying algebraic groups in the optimized protocol implementation. 2. The reference implementation typically uses different language constructions than the optimized protocol. In particular, the reference implementation uses a minimum number of statements and local variables, in exchange for more elaborate expressions. For example, expressions in the reference implementation pack program variables into product data types, and contain conditional expressions in order to eliminate the need for if-then-else statements. 3. The ZK-compiler implementation may rearrange algebraic expressions to enable the generation of optimized implementations by the lower-level code generators or back-ends.
Listing 2 shows an example observational equivalence proof goal as it appears in CertiCrypt, extracted from the deniable authentication example included in the next section. The reference and optimized implementations sit at the bottom and top, respectively.
These differences between the two implementations that we have described above are clearly visible in the code. 
( [ c t o _ n a t ] ( F s t s t ) ) ) ELSE ( ( F s t ( [ p h i ] F s t ( Snd s t ) ) [ / H] F s t ( F s t _x ) [^H] ( [ c t o _ n a t ] ( F s t s t ) ) | Snd ( [ p h i ] F s t ( Snd s t ) ) [ / H] Snd ( F s t _x ) [^H] ( [ c t o _ n a t ] ( F s t s t ) ) ) | [ p s i ] Snd ( Snd s t ) ) ]
Pleasingly, our automation approach performed well in handling such equivalence proofs, both for this example and for the ones described in §7. Specifically, we have found that tactics already implemented in CertiCrypt are ideally suited to reduce proof goals as the one in Listing 2 to lower-level verification conditions over the semantics of operators used to implement the algorithms. Thanks to this, the problem of automation becomes one of constructing Coq tactics that can solve these lower level goals. To do this, we combine the powerful decision procedures ring and omega built into Coq with customized tactics that handle patterns observed in a comprehensive set of practical examples.
Combining the results. Once the equivalence lemmas above are established, generic proof scripts are used to discharge the proof obligations associated with completeness, HVZK, and generalized special soundness of optimized implementations. The theorem statements are identical to those in §5 for the reference implementations produced by ZKCrypt, but their proofs are essentially different. We rely on a general lemma stating that any given algorithms P1, P2, V, and Vc, observationally equivalent to the respective algorithms in a reference implementation, lead to a protocol whose transcripts are distributed exactly as in the reference implementation.
Proving the completeness and honest verifier zero knowledge properties of the optimized protocol then amounts to arguing that these results are directly implied by the identical distributions displayed by reference and optimized protocol implementations. For the soundness property, one appeals directly to the correctness of the optimized V2 algorithm, which implies that an accepting trace for the optimized protocol is a valid input to the knowledge extractor that is proven to exist for the reference implementation.
MORE EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
Besides the running example presented in the previous sections, we also tested and verified the functionality of ZKCrypt based on a representative set of proof goals of academic and practical interest. We briefly report on some of these applications to illustrate the capabilities of ZKCrypt. We provide benchmarking results in Table 1 in terms of lines of code of the implementations output by the compiler and verification time of formal proofs. We note that the formal verification component of ZKCrypt described in this paper was developed in a way that is totally non-intrusive to the original CACE compiler that generates the executable implementations, and hence the efficiency of the generated C-and Javaimplementations remains unaffected.
Electronic Cash. Electronic payment systems realize fully digital analogues of classical cash systems involving bills and coins. Besides high security and privacy guarantees, real-world usability requires that they work off-line, i.e., the bank must not be required to participate in transactions. One of the first schemes satisfying this condition was suggested by Brands [14] . All phases of his scheme use ZK-PoKs as sub-protocols. For instance, when withdrawing money from a bank account, a user has to prove its identity by proving possession of a secret key. The respective proof goal is given as follows:
.
Here, I, g1, g2 ∈ Z * p such that ord g1 = ord g2 = q, where q|(p − 1) and p, q ∈ P. The secrets u1, u2 are elements of Zq. This proof goal can be realized by a single instance of the Σ φ -protocol.
Deniable Authentication. Any Σ-protocol can be transformed into a non-interactive protocol using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [29] . The idea is to substitute the verifier's first algorithm by a cryptographic hash function: Instead of relying on V to choose the challenge c uniformly at random, the prover computes c itself as c ← H(r), where r is the commitment computed in its first step. It then computes its response s as in the original protocol. Upon receiving (r, c, s), the verifier checks whether the triple is an accepting conversation, and whether c = H(r).
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Clearly, proofs obtained in this way are not deniable. Namely, the verifier can convince a third party that it knows the prover's secret by just forwarding (r, c, s). This problem can be solved by migrating to designated verifier ZK proofs: assume a public key infrastructure, where each party deposits a public key. The prover then shows that it either knows the secret key for its own public key, or the secret key of the verifier. The resulting authentication scheme is deniable, as V could simulate proofs using its own secret key.
To make things concrete, we briefly recap the scheme of Wang and Song [51] here. A party A holds a secret key x A ∈ Zq, and publishes the corresponding public key y A = (y 1A , y 2A ) = (g x A , h x A ), where q ∈ P and g, h are elements of Z * p with order q. Now, authenticating P towards V boils down to the following proof goal:
As the order q of g, h is known, this proof goal can be realized using the Σ φ -protocol and Boolean compositions [25] .
Ring Signatures. A ring signature scheme allows a set of parties to sign documents on behalf of the whole group [48] , without revealing the identities of the signers. Such schemes are often realized by modifying the Fiat-Shamir transformation as follows: instead of setting c ← H(r), the prover sets c ← H(r, m), hashing the pair (m, r) where m is the message to be signed. In a very basic scenario one wants to allow each member of the group to issue signatures on behalf of the group. Let therefore be given a PKI containing public keys (y A , e A ) ∈ Z * n A × Z for strong RSA moduli n A , and let each party A hold its secret key x A satisfying y A = x e A A . For simplicity, assume further that the group consists of only three parties. Then the proof goal is given by:
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ZPK (x1, x2, x3) : y1 = x Again, as the domain of each mapping x → x e i is finite, realization is done using the Σ φ -protocol and Boolean compositions [25] .
Summary. Our experimental results illustrate that ZKCrypt is flexible enough to generate and verify implementations for a large set of proof goals occurring in practically relevant applications. We observe that, although proof verification is performed automatically, the performance of the developed Coq/Certicrypt tactics degrades significantly for proof goals based on the Σ GSP -protocol. This is due to the complexity of the formalization of the underlying algebraic structures, which involve the definition of product homomorphisms with a large number of inputs and outputs.
RELATED WORK
Cryptographic compilers for ZK-PoK were studied before in two different lines of work; in the setting of the CACE project [2, 5, 6, 16] and for e-cash applications [43] .
The CACE compiler is a certifying compiler that generates efficient implementations of zero-knowledge protocols. The compiler takes moderately abstract specifications of proof goals as input and generates C or Java implementations. The core compilation steps (i.e., all but the backends) are certifying in the sense that they generate an Isabelle [46] proof of the existence of a knowledge extractor guaranteeing special soundness. However, neither the fundamental zero-knowledge property nor completeness are addressed by the compiler, and the verification component only supports a very limited set of proof goals, not including the Σ GSP -protocol. ZKCrypt builds on the compilation functionality of the CACE compiler, adding a new front-end and a completely reengineered verification component. Moreover, it solves several minor bugs, some of which were uncovered as a direct consequence of the new formal verification back-end development.
The ZKPDL compiler generates efficient distributed implementations of ZK-PoKs from high-level goals [43] . It has been used to build a realistic e-cash library. ZKPDL offers a level of abstraction similar to ours, but foregoes any attempt to verify the generated code and supports a more restricted set of proof goals.
Besides tools for ZK-PoK, a large variety of other domain specific compilers exists, e.g., Fairplay [42] , VIFF [28] and the tool described in [41] for generating implementations of secure twoparty computations. Also, generic cryptographic compilers offering differently abstract input languages have been proposed, e.g., [4, 7, 37, 50] . However, none of those tools supports formal verification.
A number of works have considered applications of formal verification to ZK-PoK. Barthe et al. [11] use CertiCrypt to prove soundness, completeness, and zero-knowledge of Σ φ -protocols and simple And/Or-compositions thereof. Although these results were constructed by hand and needed to be extended for a wider range of proof goals and arbitrary Boolean compositions, they are at the genesis of the formal verification infrastructure of ZKCrypt. Backes et al. [3] propose a method for checking that zero-knowledge proofs are adequately used, and apply their method to the DAA protocol.
CONCLUSIONS
ZKCrypt is an experimental high-assurance zero-knowledge compiler that applies state-of-the-art approaches in verified and verifying compilation to the realm of cryptography. It achieves an unprecedented level of confidence among cryptographic compilers. The verification infrastructure of ZKCrypt is based on the CertiCrypt platform, and relies on a set of carefully isolated concepts, including a new unified approach to special soundness and a novel formal treatment of goal resolution as a compilation step. We demonstrated that the compiler and the verification component are able to handle a large number of applications using ZK-PoKs.
There are plenty of avenues for future research in the field of cryptographic compilation and verification in general, and for the class of ZK-PoKs in particular. One future task is to verify the last stage of the compiler chain, code generation, to cover the entire compilation process. An interesting question is how far verified compilation can be extended beyond ZK-PoKs.
